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Information leakage in innovation outsourcing

Titel{Information leakage in innovation outsourcing}
Publication TypeJournal Article
Jahr der Veröffentlichung2009
AutorenHo, S. J.
JournalR&D Management
Volume39
Seitennummerierung431–443
Typ des ArtikelsJournal article
SchlüsselwörterBWL, Innovation
Zusammenfassung

This paper studies an R&D outsourcing contract between a firm and a contractor, considering the possibility that in the interim stage, the contractor might sell the innovation to a rival firm. Our result points out that due to the competition in the interim stage, the reward needed to prevent leakage will be pushed up to the extent that a profitable leakage-free contract does not exist. This result will also apply to cases considering revenue-sharing schemes and a disclosure punishment for commercial theft. Then, we demonstrate that in a competitive mechanism where the R&D firm hires two contractors together with a relative performance scheme, the disclosure punishment might help and there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the probability of information leakage is lower and the equilibrium reward is also cheaper than hiring one contractor.

URLhttp://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/122651164/ABSTRACT
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